Research
I am interested in the subjective experiences (or, using philosophical jargon, the "what-it-is-likeness"), and the extent to which they are be shared and communicated. This results in my enthusiasm in the science of the mind and philosophy of mind. See below for my research projects.
Representationalism
and aspect shifts
Representationalism is (roughly) the idea that the phenomenal properties of experiences are explained by their representational properties – that is, what it is like to undergo an experience is explained by what the experience is about. It has been argued that the phenomenon of aspect shift poses a challenge to representationalism.
In this project, I focus on one particular aspect shift and address the following two questions:
(a) Does the aspect shift in question pose a challenge to represesentationalism?
(b) If so, what claim does it challenge? Relatedly, what counts as a satisfactory response from representationalism?
Mental illness and Self-blame
It is very normal for those who are suffering from mental illness (e.g. depression) to blame themselves for the fact that they are suffering from mental illness. For example, those who suffer from situational depression (i.e., depression following a traumatic event in one's life) might blame themselves for their illness, because they believe that had they been mentally stronger, they would be able to overcome the depression. Recognition of one's failure to fulfill one's duty towards others (e.g. being a loving father and a supportive family member) due to one's mental illness can also lead to this type of self-blame.
I hope to explore the following question in this project: under what conditions is it appropriate to blame oneself for one's mental illness? Orthodox theories approach this question by considering three factors: (a) the person being blamed; (b) the blamer; (c) the blaming interaction. The propriety conditions of self-blame in the context of mental illness raise interesting questions to all three factors.
Other topics
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Blame and Forgiveness
when it is morally permissible to blame, when it is morally good to forgive
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Cognitive Phenomenology
whether introspection can provide any evidence for the (in)existence of cognitive phenomenology
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Consciousness
its relation to attention, overflow, global workspace theory
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Emotion
enactivist theories, recalcitrant emotions, taxonomy of emotions
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Explanation in Cognitive Science and Neuroscience
whether cognitive science and neuroscience provides any explanation of human mind and behavior; if so, what is its relation to other types of explanation (e.g. folk psychology)
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Imagination and Empathy
the extent to which they are possible and morally justified
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Mental Content
naturalistic theories, action-first approach
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Perception and Cognition
what is the border between them, if there is any
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Personal Identity
psychological criterion, Derek Parfit
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Pictorial Representation
its relation to mental representation
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Transformative Experience
whether it is possible to formalize a rational decision strategy concerning a transformative experience; if so, what logical properties does it have
Additionally, you can find my tennis-related research proposals here.